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Abstract 
Growth in the Armed Forces undertaking public policing is occurring in the United 
Kingdom and elsewhere and as such a complex security landscape emerges, both 
practically and conceptually. The aim here is to pose questions of the manifest and 
latent issues in the assemblage of multiple actors in public policing. It aks to reader 
to consider the implications of military actors transitioning from defence duties 
ordinarily associated with military work, to policing activities in public spaces. Taking 
the London 2012 Olympic Games as our point of reference, this article argues that to 
understand military presence, their role must be considered in the broader context of 
military and policing functions, the ‘war on terror’, accountability, and future priorities 
for public policing. We must be careful not to assign the presence of the military into 
pre-existing understandings of how mega-events should be secured – the military 
patrolling the streets of London represents more. Instead, as their presence comes 
to be legitimate in certain geopolitical contexts, critical questions must be asked 
especially as public and private arrangements are continually reworked in the 
domestic fight against terrorism.  
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Introduction  
This paper questioning the future of evolving security landscapes and military 
assistance for domestic security. It comes at a time in recent British history where 
the military are more readily seen guarding sites or patrolling streets of the mainland 
United Kingdom. Operation Temperer, a British government plan to deploy troops to 
support police officers, has been implemented twice in 2017, first following an 
explosion at a music concert in Manchester in May, and second in response to an 
improvised explosive device detonating on a commuter train in London in September. 
Between 23rd and 27th May 2017 armed troops were seen alongside armed police at 
a range of sites, such as parliament buildings and entrances. In September 2017, 
troops were sent to replace armed police at sites such as nuclear establishments to 
release armed Civil Nuclear Constabulary police officers, therefore making them 
available for public policing roles. 
 
These instances are unique, but more frequently occurring. Such a deployment of 
the armed military in May 2017 had not been seen since the then Prime Minister 
Tony Blair authorised military deployment to Heathrow airport, London, in 2003 
following intelligence of an imminent terror threat. A visible armed military presence 
is not uncommon in neighbouring European countries. Indeed, following terror 
attacks in the Netherlands, German and France, the military guarding and patrolling 
key sites and venues is not uncommon, although however have been the target of 
knife attacks perhaps for reasons of them representing the epitome of securitisation.  
The United Kingdom has not adopted a similar security regime, rather deploying and 
repealing military assistance momentarily. However, what we do see, and can 
potentially forecast, is a more frequent and potentially extended use of the military in 
public spaces despite currently measured decisions over their use. As demands for 
public security greaten, politicians may see military assistance to the police as an 
increasingly appealing option on a more routine basis. What we see now as unique 
events, could, depending on decisions taken within a given prevailing security 
discourse, become a more commonly witnessed resource intervention. Moreover, 
the role and function of the military in these roles potentially could be more diverse. 
 
The purpose of this article is to raise some cautionary notes on the future of military-
police assemblages that combine under the auspices of domestic security. Central to 
what is outlined here is that use, diversification, and/or intensity in the deployment of 
military personnel alongside the public police brings about a different kind of 
soldiering. To contextualise this issue, this article positions the example of unarmed 
military assistance at the London Olympic Games in 2012. This is a unique example 
of what may or may not be consigned to history, however the general rhetoric of 
‘success’ that surrounded it may well mean that in a future where heavier demands 
are placed on the public police, a reality of security landscapes that incorporate the 
military further is imaginable.   
 
 
  
‘Policing’ the London 2012 Olympic Games 
The 2012 London Olympic Games occupies a particular space in society’s 
consciousness of global events. In itself the Olympic Games illustrates a sporting 
mega-event, it does so against a backcloth of other historical events. The London 
Olympic Games represents a spectacle of sport, but it is more than this. It is a 
promotion of peace through sport (Sugden, 2012) but at the same time signifies the 
convergence of police-military operations to securitise the environment from ‘war’ 
(Coaffee, 2015; MacDonald and Hunter, 2013). The London Olympics was 
underpinned by a series of geo-political and socio-political issues, namely the legacy 
of previous violent attacks on Olympic Games (for example, Munich and Atlanta)(see, 
Boyle and Haggaerty, 2012; Sugden, 2012), over a decade of rhetorical, policy and 
operational focus on the post 9/11 ‘war on terror’ and, widespread social unrest less 
than twelve months earlier (UK summer riots of 2011). 
 
Yet, despite the context outlined above, the London Olympic Games of 2012 was 
widely regarded as a competent and successful security operation; at the forefront of 
that success, the military being credited for their assistive role to the police and a 
problematic private security provider (G4S) with some 18,200 troops deployed. While 
there were concerns for some of the security arrangements that were militaristic in 
nature (for example, the docking of a naval warship on the banks of the River 
Thames, see Evans, 2012a), an overwhelming public support for military 
involvement prevailed. The London Olympics in 2012, for a series of reasons, 
seemingly was an example of military intervention that did not generate significant 
unease about engaging the military in quasi-policing roles.  In fact, as soldiers 
patrolled the streets of London, onlookers witnessed a fundamental change in the 
relationship between the military and public police roles. What is more, this military 
presence accrued public support, with many reporting their ease and almost 
celebration of being searched by soldiers:  
 
The public love them, their efficiency, friendly nature and some of the women 
coming into the Park often admit there is that man-in-uniform factor. “I was 
very happy to see the soldiers”, says Liz Gluckman, arriving with her family 
from Cobham. “They were very friendly and smiling”. “And they were efficient”, 
adds her husband Ray, with some speed. “We came to a test event here last 
year and it was very slow. But today we just went through in one minute, if 
that” (BBC News, 2012). 
 
A public acceptance of an unarmed military policing London veiled some pressing 
issues and presents an opportunity to ask important questions – something which we 
aim to illuminate upon here. This article is the product of questions, rather than 
answers that has been troubling us for some time - in particular, since the London 
Olympics 2012. Our questioning was brought into sharp focus after the attacks in 
Paris in November 2015, and more recent deployments in the UK in 2017, and as a 
result, we offer them here. We, as many others have noted, contend that the 
  
securitisation of the Olympic Games represented a sophisticated network of counter-
terrorism technologies, the deployment of multidisciplinary personnel and 
complexities of governance and accountability, post- 9/11. These sophisticated 
technologies have been the focus of academics for some time and can be found far 
beyond scholarship that takes the London Games or recent events as their focus. 
 
There is much to learn from scholarship which has aimed its focus on the distinctions 
between the police and the military as there also is from a more recent academic 
interest in the blurring of policing roles and responsibilities (Ryan 2001; Loader and 
Percy, 2012; Degenhardt, 2013, 2016). In McCulloch’s (2016) analysis, an 
examination of roles indicates a trajectory of a weaponisation of the police. The 
constabularisation of the military has also been a feature of intellectual debate 
(Murray, 2015). However, while these are valuable insights, the London Olympic 
Games of 2012 introduced more than a blurring in security provision. For those in 
operational roles as well as scholarly onlookers’ challenges are evident, precisely 
‘how an unarmed military can be understood conceptually and practically?’  
 
To address such a question, it is necessary to first situate the matter in the 
background of what is already known of the context in which securitisation takes 
place within. Secondly, we offer insights into the multifaceted, multi-disciplinary 
enterprise of policing. Here we discuss the blurring of customary and institutional 
boundaries and the divergence from traditional practices. The policing operations of 
the London Olympic Games of 2012 very much challenge the history of both 
institutions. Thirdly, we bring together our discussions and concerns in articulating 
some of the potential consequences of the deployment of the military in policing 
roles.  
 
Given that official oratory branded the London Olympic of 2012 a major success, 
how may such policing practices displayed in this event become routine or be 
replicated more widely? Such questions act as an important point of reflection for 
operations strategists in a practical sense, but also for the scholarly field which to 
date appears to mostly ignore such a phenomenon.  
 
Disentangling metaphors 
The events of September 11th 2001 radically redefined the global security landscape 
and its scholarship, both in how we understand terrorism and how we understand 
counter-terrorism (see, Houlihan and Giulianotti, 2012). The debates, between and 
within disciplines have since been sprightly. However, there is a consensus that 9/11 
represents, symbolically or otherwise, a watershed moment for understandings of 
security. While scholars had suggested for some time that the roles of the police and 
the role of the military were perhaps not as easy to distinguish as they had been 
traditionally, questions such as; ‘what is the role of the police?’ and ‘what is the role 
of the military?’ have become much more urgent to understand in the face of global 
insecurity.  
  
 
To make sense of the complex picture, we argue that this blurring of policing form 
and function can be understood across four categories. These are: language and 
discourse, space, functions and delivery. Inspired by Weiss (2011, p. 402) and his 
invitation to those concerned with the blurring of police and military, to add to a 
‘broad and lively’ debate by considering ‘definitional differences between the two 
forces and in their working methods, the legal framework of their functioning, and on 
the role of services between them’, the first task of this here is to consider an 
unarmed Armed Forces and the necessity of further reflection. The broad and lively 
debate that Weiss (2011) is referring to aims to capture how internal and external 
security is continually reworked as globalising processes and counter-terror 
strategies advance. Conventional narratives that assume a simple binary distinction 
between us/them or good/bad become more problematic. All relations, in fact, enter 
into what Agamben (1998) termed a ‘zone of indistinction’, which poses a 
fundamental challenge for legal frameworks. As counter-terror is now synonymous 
with many political ambitions, strategies have developed to merge military provision 
with police provision and practices of war with law enforcement. The implications, as 
Ryan (2013) explains, are that conventional limits concerning roles and functions are 
turned into strategic linkages and assemblages. 
 
To begin the language and discourse that now permeates counter-terror strategies 
both domestically and internationally encourages the use of ‘war’ and ‘justice’ 
interchangeably. It is well documented that one cannot escape the war metaphor in 
criminological discourse (Garland, 1996; Ruggiero, 2005). The ‘war on terror’ is just 
one example of how policing functions are spoken of regarding ‘war’. What is 
perhaps not so well documented in criminology is that warfare relies more and more 
frequently upon metaphors of criminal justice (Degenhardt, 2010; Murray, 2015). This 
is realised through a language that situates and perceives insurgents not as actors of 
war but rather as criminals. This tendency has, in fact, been slowly maturing for 
some time. Earlier examples can be found, for instance, in a language constructed 
around the need to ‘punish’ or react to illegal behaviours in both the first Gulf war, 
Kosovo (Degenhardt, 2010) and in Northern Ireland (Murray, 2015). It is perhaps 
now more apparent however in public and political rhetoric, exemplified with notions 
such as to ‘bring terrorists to justice’ and ‘eliminate the threat that they pose’ (Blair, 
2001). In this altered security terrain, the management of the risks of violence cannot 
be divorced from asking where ‘war’ takes place, which is perhaps why the military 
presence to counter terror threats within domestic space was largely unquestioned.  
  
The category of space refers to state borders. What followed post 9/11, as Bauman 
(2002: 87) notes, was the ‘symbolic end to the era of space’, and importantly for 
policing studies, this meant the police assuming new counter-terror roles, as the front 
line of the war on terror was everywhere. Whilst borders have always been porous 
(Bauman, 2002), the notion of territory was reconfigured post 9/11, epistemologies of 
‘crime’ and ‘war’ that are predicated upon linear territorial modelling have lost much 
  
credibility as the Western world wages a ‘war on terror’ as global counter-terror 
strategies mean that domestic and international responses share the same political 
and juridical spaces. With the collapse in spatial awareness between modernist 
constructs of inside and outside, risks no longer have points of origin. The 
conception of war, as such, is invariably transformed as fundamental questions of 
spatial integrity are undermined (Holmquist, 2012). This does not mean to say that 
questions of spatial integrity are no longer necessary or of issue. On the contrary, in 
our radically interconnected world, all problems are internal problems (Bauman 
2002). Given the wider political significance, upon this altered terrain the reach of 
criminal justice policy is interrogated as a problem of policing and an attempt to 
protect the domestic through international designs (Kraska, 2007; Krasman, 2007; 
Loader and Percy, 2012). 
 
To understand the functional blurring in security provisions is to speak to the 
militarisation of the public police and the constabularisation of the military. Easton 
and Moelkers (2007) have already pointed to the challenges that both security 
services will face as they take on one another’s characters. Scholars who focus on 
the ‘militarisation’ of the police analyse how the public police rely more heavily upon 
military equipment and special units inspired by military designs (Kraska, 2007; 
Krasman, 2007; Loader and Percy 2012; Murray, 2015; Ryan, 2013). Arguments 
have been advanced, in particular in the context of counter-terrorism policing, of the 
consequences (unintended or otherwise) of shifts in the public police utilising military 
tactics and hardware. The idea that terrorism is conceived of as a new form of 
violence threatening democracies has often been a basis to develop the claim that 
preparedness requires revision to the public policing methodologies. Military 
involvement in police training and collaborative activities between the public police 
and the military are emblematic of a professional convergence commonly occurring 
in countries such as the United States (see, Campbell and Campbell, 2016).  
 
We see evidence, and there are some excellent scholarly analyses on a 
militarisation of public policing, whereby the traditional public police unit take on the 
form and function of the military on the nation’s streets (see, Rantatalo, 2012). 
Similarly, some jurisdictions outside the UK have sought to build firmer and stronger 
links between the public police and military units to capacity-build protective 
mechanisms (see Kirby, Graham and Green, 2013). Variants of these approaches 
exist also, and so arguably who exactly undertakes a domestic policing role 
continues on a trajectory of opaqueness. One such example is The European 
Gendarmerie Force (EUROGENDFOR); a European Union enterprise with 
signatories of a Treaty from France, Portugal, Spain, Poland, The Netherlands, 
Romania and Italy. Described as a multinational police force, the EUROGENDFOR 
can be entitled to executive police powers (for example being armed) and can be 
deployed alongside the military where local police forces are deemed ineffective 
amidst high levels of insecurity and/or criminality. Moreover, the EUROGENDFOR 
may act under a civilian or a military chain of command. Benefits of such an 
  
approach to shore up resilience have apparently been accepted in some quarters. 
However, this further evidence of policing pluralism remains controversial, not least 
in their force capability, their deployment rationale, accountability, transparency and 
antithetical positioning to democratic policing (Statewatch, 2006).  
 
Military assistance to the public police has been a prominent narrative of 
contemporary public order policing and counter-terrorism strategies. An increase in 
‘threat’ and concern over the availability of traditional police resourcing has prompted 
renewed political and policy attention over the preparedness of UK resources to 
preserve public safety and security. Public policing continues to exist in an austere 
climate, and concerns have been levied over the number of police officers nationally. 
Law and order agendas (and who is tasked with their enforcement) have accrued 
political attention in the wake of civil disturbances such as the summer 2011 riots 
across some UK towns and cities. In this example, Prime Minister of the Coalition 
government of the time, David Cameron, called for a development of policing 
contingencies to ‘fight back’ against civil unrest. Articulated along the rhetorical lines 
of ‘Broken Britain’, Cameron pledged to address the problem of criminality through 
enhanced civil defence strategies, namely drawing upon the military to undertake 
policing roles to ’free-up’ the police to continue with other police duties.  
 
The UK’s summer 2011 riots (see Briggs, 2012), and the political oratory which took 
place at the time and after had a lasting effect on the nomenclature of policing. 
London Mayor of the time, Boris Johnson agreed to the purchase of water canon 
(not seen in deployment since Northern Ireland) which was met with criticism on the 
basis of it being an over exuberance in the availability of (indiscriminate) force and 
therefore a direct challenge to principles of policing by consent and a use of force 
proportionate with the threat presented. These purchases paralleled broader 
concerns of increased weaponisation of the public police such as ‘sound cannons’, 
Taser, batten rounds, irritant projectiles and ‘skunk oil’. Moreover, official vocabulary 
has been shaped with militaristic influence. Policing at times of civil unrest has been 
described by authorities and the media as a ‘conflict zone’, where those tasked with 
policing are ‘combatting’ ‘insurgency’. The war narratives presented serve to obscure 
the differentiation between domestic and external threat, and counsel the audience 
in such a way that domination and exacting force are the principal ways to deal with 
the perceived threat. Self-referential statements propagated that refer to a ‘war on 
terror’, a ‘war on lawlessness’ and an increasing insecurity may well serve as an 
impetus for greater military involvement in policing. Authorising (by governments and 
consented to by some quarters of society) enhanced capabilities of force, then, 
shape public police-military assemblages without question. 
 
The constabularisation of the military is seen to have occurred in two distinct ways: 
the first is to allow them to be involved in internal security provisions (Easton and 
Moelkers, 2007) such as airport security (Brooks, 2005) and border control (Dover, 
2008). Weiss (2011) explains that the military is ushered into these arrangements 
  
when the public police do not have the capabilities.  The second way that the military 
is considered to have been constabularised is when they are deployed to conflict or 
post-conflict zones to perform ‘peacekeeping’ tasks such as those carried out by the 
police (Banton, 2005). In these cases, the military conduct patrols (Loader and 
Percy, 2012) and can only use military force if they come under attack (Tsagourias, 
2006). When the military is deployed in this way, they must use different methods of 
soldiering than those they would use while at war. This form of soldiering, Kaldor 
(2013) suggests, is a form of policing – or is situated between traditional 
understandings of policing and soldiering. This is perhaps the closest referent we 
have for the role of the military where personnel work alongside the public police, 
private companies and the judiciary as a facilitator of order and security. Loader and 
Percy (2007: 249 cited in Weiss, 2011) consider the US framing of this role as the 
‘world policeman’ a metaphor that invites us into this blurring of functions. Yet, while 
the military is not permitted to use force unless under attack – they are of course still 
armed.  
 
Trading places   
Despite the well-developed literature that accounts for pluralisation and third-party 
policing, a different type of arrangement is evidenced in the London Olympic Games 
2012 example. Scholarly considerations of the ‘blurring’ of policing form and 
functions, as has been seen above, is ubiquitous in delivering a narrative of a 
‘sharing’ of tactics. However, when comparing the public policing role and the role of 
the majority of military personnel deployed to the London Olympic Games of 2012 a 
‘reversal’ of roles is apparent. Issued with handcuffs, Royal Navy and Army police 
worked alongside police units such as the Metropolitan Police’s ‘Territorial Support 
Group’ (Qasim, 2012). Also, unarmed military personnel engaged in other security 
duties such as security checks, bag searches and patrols. They did this on a daily 
basis alongside around 9000 armed and unarmed public police (Magnay, 2012). By 
contrast, the military was asked to adopt policing ‘soft-skills’ in their deployment for 
the winning of the ‘hearts and minds’ of the public while armed police were 
conceivably on the ‘front-line’ of the ‘war on terror’. In essence, the military 
represented traditional democratic policing functions while the public police 
undertook the role force/weaponised deterrent ordinarily assigned to the military. 
Furthermore, the deployment of the military at the Games was also under a public 
police chain of command; something which challenges traditional military 
deployments.   
 
Nothing is known of an unarmed military operating alongside the public police in a 
context seen at the London Games in 2012. The military deployed on the streets of 
London in 2012, during peacetime, have no more powers than civilians – they can 
only make a citizen’s arrest under section 24A of the Police and Criminal Evidence 
Act 1984. The military is bound by military Aid to the Civil Authorities – yet this 
framework does not speak to those who are unarmed (as we do here) – the fact is 
that when the military police in this way they have the same powers as private 
  
security providers of citizen arrest. Although as Quasim (2012) rightly noted when on 
night patrol in London, military personnel were equipped with handcuffs. Many have 
argued that distinctions between the public and private, and between crime and war 
are now a fabrication – the lines between them impossible to draw outside of 
university walls (Evans, 2012b; Loader and Percy, 2012; Murray 2015, Walker 1993). 
In practice, however, the picture is just as complex – not least when one comes to 
consider accountability frameworks in which one must be able to redraw these lines. 
The public police, the military and private security providers all have different 
leadership structures which manage their conduct in very different ways. That said, 
globalising processes are increasingly rendering ideas of the inside and outside of 
security less apparent and absolute. 
 
There is an established principle in the United Kingdom of the military providing 
assistance to the civilian authorities in some circumstances. Such provision is 
termed MACA (MOD, 2007). The delivery of such aid is guided by three criteria: 
 
(i) Military aid should always be the last resort. The use of mutual aid, other 
agencies, and the private sector must otherwise be considered as insufficient 
or be unsuitable. 
(ii) The Civil Authority lacks the capability to fulfil the task and it is 
unreasonable or prohibitively expensive to expect it to develop one. 
(iii) The Civil Authority has a capability, but the need to act is urgent and it 
lacks readily available resources. 
 
The nature of the aid provided has ranged from the use of Special Forces troops in 
terrorist incidents to the provision of logistical and engineering support in times of 
natural disasters such as outbreaks of foot and mouth disease and flooding. The 
security operation surrounding the 2012 Games in London was an enormous 
undertaking. In the initial planning phase, the use of military personnel and 
equipment was factored into the operation. Their use was in a variety of specialist 
security roles (Ministry of Defence, 2011). However, as the start of the Games 
approached it became apparent that the security company G4S, who had been 
contracted to provide venue security across a range of sites, were failing to deliver 
the required numbers of personnel. An already overstretched public police was 
unable to fill the gap. This resulted in the deployment of additional troops in a more 
general, non-specialist security role. 
 
Military guidelines do make reference to supporting the public police in public order 
operations. The instructions are specific regarding the nature of this aid stating, 
‘services may be requested to provide logistic support such as accommodation, 
stores, transport or catering’ (Ministry of Defence, 2007). The use of military 
personnel in a direct operational role in the context of a public order/security 
operation seemed to represent a departure from the accepted form of military 
support, which is generally protective and/or supportive. The use of military 
  
personnel in a more regulatory or enforcement role akin to a ‘policing’ role raises 
important questions. There is what has been described as the unthinkable, as the 
English Revolution suggested, using the military against civilians (Head and Mann, 
2013). The addition of military personnel to the Olympic operation, however, was 
widely welcomed by the public, press and media. They were mostly portrayed as the 
saviours of the day while the failed security company G4S were consistently vilified. 
Boykoff (2014) makes sense of this unquestioning mood as a form of ‘celebration 
capitalism’ which occurs in a ‘state of exception’ and allows for lop-sided public-
private partnerships. However, he also warns that such a mood of bonhomie allows 
‘plucky politicos and their corporate pals to push policies they wouldn't dream of 
during normal times’ (Boykoff, 2014). 
 
Regarding command and control, military personnel deployed under MACA, 
operations remain under the command of their officers and non-commissioned 
officers. The military attends to their defined task within the overall scope of the 
operation in question. The responsibility for the overall operation sits with the lead 
agency - be that the police, local authority or another body. There is a clear 
legislative framework for the deployment of the military in the form of the Civil 
Contingencies Act 2004 and the Emergency Powers Act 1964. The legislation merely 
provides the basis for the use of the military. However, as Head and Mann (2013) 
observe, the Civil Contingencies Act 2004 does provide the power to activate 
emergency powers which can be wide-ranging and in which the role of the military is 
ill-defined. The military role is not subject to any particular form of scrutiny or 
accountability. This raises greater concerns when the nature of deployment is in an 
enforcement or regulatory role, as in 2012.  
 
The Armed Forces Act 2006, as amended by the Armed Forces Act 2011, regulates 
the conduct of military personnel. Individuals are also answerable to the criminal and 
civil law generally. The Armed Forces Acts are designed to regulate conduct in a 
military setting and to promote order and military efficiency. They contain no specific 
processes or provisions to hold the particular service or any individuals accountable 
for the conduct of, and within, operations such as the Olympic security operation.  
 
The Olympic deployment does raise questions about the suitability of military 
personnel for a civil enforcement role. They are trained for a fundamentally different 
role and one that does not generally require the ability to deal with the complexities 
of conflict resolution on an individual level. The questions of reasonable use of force 
and proportionality are not core considerations in the military context. Military 
commanders are indeed familiar with the concept of ‘mission creep’ (Rizer, 2015). 
This refers to the unintended and unplanned widening of involvement in a situation in 
response to unseen events.  Thus personnel become more deeply embroiled in a 
situation than was originally intended and sometimes beyond their ability to deal with 
it. This is an ever-present danger in enforcement operations. It remains to be seen if 
the Olympic deployment represents a one-off event in the nature of the deployment. 
  
However, with questions now being raised about the police firearms capability 
following recent developments in European countries, debate and the policy 
trajectory may continue towards a role for the military in law enforcement operations. 
While fundamental questions were in the main overlooked, specifically around 
accountability and suitability, the general excitement for the Games meant that these 
matters were not raised by the public.  
 
 
Soldiering by consent  
The Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 affords police officers the capacity to use 
‘reasonable’ force on behalf of the State. This is directly linked to accountability 
frameworks in place to ensure that the force used is required in the circumstances – 
in those events when the force used is disproportionate to the lawful objective, the 
behaviour of officers may be considered unlawful. Taking the lead for security on 
British soil is, of course, the responsibility of the public police. The legality of this is 
underpinned by an ideology of ‘consent’ (Waddington and Wright, 2010). Jackson et 
al. (2012: 2) note:  
 
Models of crime-control of this sort recognise the importance of the legitimacy 
of justice institutions and the legal system. Legitimacy is the public belief that 
institutions have the right to exist, the right to undertake the functions assigned 
to them, and the right to dictate appropriate behaviour. A legitimate authority 
has the right to exercise power: it commands consent (a sense of obligation to 
obey) that is grounded in legality and moral alignment. 
 
Policing requires legitimacy and the consent of the public; in essence, a ‘confidence 
in justice’ is a necessary objective (ibid). This is most likely to occur when policing 
practices and behaviours are consistent with public expectations (Rowe, 2002). 
Consent and legitimacy are jeopardised where the presence of arbitrary force and/or 
partisanship occurs. Paramilitary policing techniques, as seen for example in the 
1970s and 1980s in Northern Ireland, present real challenges to notions of legitimacy 
and policing by consent (Weitzer, 1985). The legitimacy of policing actions is not 
solely rooted in reality, rather perceptions (Bradford, Jackson and Hough, 2013) and 
the presence of normative safeguards which foster integrity are important too. 
Accountability is closely tied to concepts of ‘policing by consent’. Accountability takes 
a range of forms; it may be manifest in moral decision-making, embedded in codes 
of professional conduct and formalised in legal regulation (see Dixon, Coleman and 
Bottomley, 1990). Frameworks of police accountability in the UK are tripartite in 
nature between the Home Office, Police Crime Commissioners and Chief 
Constables. At an operational level, individual police officers are bound by 
professional standards, the law and expected competencies, with a clear chain of 
command from constable upwards. However, as Holdaway (1983) suggests matters 
of police practices and accountability cannot be reduced to such a rudimentary form 
in an occupation where extremes exist, and where discretion forms a dominant facet 
  
of daily work, the translation of standards from senior ranks to constables may well 
be less confidently asserted or operationalised. 
 
While analyses on the blurring of policing roles contributed by scholars such as 
Loader and Percy (2007) illuminate on issues a great deal, what is striking, however, 
is that the military as an unarmed support for a mixed public and private policing 
sector remains under-explored. What then of when soldiers police? Should this also 
be underpinned by a similar ideology of consent? As this unarmed personnel are 
given stop and search powers, the ‘consent’ of these functions is an important issue 
to consider. Indeed, matters of accountability are central in considering the 
vulnerability of the public (having indistinguishable lines of redress/complaint) and of 
soldiers themselves (lack of rules/systems where individual soldier accountability can 
be adjudicated on fairly and with representation). In the context of third-party 
policing, as Mazerolle and Ransley (2005) conceive, new situations, a lack of 
protocols and a plurality of policing agents raise a multitude of ethical issues.  
 
Clausewitz (1976) suggested that it was the result of irresolvable political crises that 
demanded the soldiers leave the barracks. Soldiers as such were only meant to 
appear in times of extreme crises and endangerment. The world’s biggest private 
security firm [G4S] was supposed to supply more than 10,000 guards for London 
Olympic venues in accordance with its £284million contract. However, it failed to 
come through, forcing the London Organising Committee of the Olympic Games to 
call in an additional 4700 troops as backup (Boykoff and Fussey, 2014).  
 
The soldiers who came to play a role in the Games, therefore, stepped into a 
‘security gap’ created – not by a civil authority lacking capability – but by a contract 
delivery shortfall from a private security provider. Their military ‘business’ at that 
moment was to act as a safety net for a private corporation and an already quasi-
police force. This is not so much a blurring of police and military boundaries, but it 
represents a militarisation of corporate security. This introduces a whole new layer of 
blurred accountability. If the role of the military is ill-defined at times of civil 
contingency, it is perhaps more unclear when stepping in for a marketised security 
contract.  
 
What is also interesting, however, is that the failure of the private sector to deliver on 
its contract was not problematized regarding the future delivery of criminal justice 
provision. Evans (2012b) is correct to point out that: 
 
While politicians have taken G4S to task over its contractual failures, the 
critique of private security provisions, in principle, is absent from the debate… 
the very nature of sovereignty itself is replaced by a technocratic ensemble of 
private/public, military/policing, local/global contractors. 
 
  
To whom are these new private/public/military security partnerships accountable 
then? G4S are ultimately answerable to market forces, while their personnel are 
civilians accountable to the civil and criminal law. These dynamics are muddied 
when soldiers (armed or unarmed) step into the void. As a slight but important aside, 
do we need to question the very viability of a mixed and competitive market to deliver 
security in the face of terror threats? If a diverse market of security provision reached 
such a crisis at the 2012 Olympic Games that the army had to be drafted in, does 
this arrangement truly constitute security? The mixed markets of security and justice 
were sold on the premise that they would increase efficiency, transfer risk from the 
public purse and strengthen local approaches (see for example Fox and Albertson, 
2011). When mixed markets fail, however, what emerges is an emergency state 
situation.  
 
 
The metamorphosis of the military mission   
With a blurring of function, roles and responsibilities come a direct challenge to the 
deeply impressed cultural conditions of the military institution. It is important to bear 
witness to how alterations, advancements and a reimagining of policing in 
democratic societies impacts. As Wilson (2008) explains, institutions are not 
monolithic, nor do they exist in vacuous spaces. The cultural components of an 
organisation, be that the environment of work, the intended aim of the work, and 
importantly those involved in delivering the work, are hugely influential in structuring 
both formal and informal rules, obligations, values and behaviours. The context in 
which work takes place within, and the overt and more discreet cultural forces that 
are at work, orientate the social view of work for the occupational body and affect the 
overall functioning of the collective group. 
 
Separately, the cultural dimensions of police work and military work have been well 
documented. Broadly speaking, police work has largely been viewed as taking place 
in an environment where extremes exist. The polarity of experience exists; with 
activities that are relatively pedestrian in nature (e.g. routine patrols, community 
liaison) and at the same time, these activities can be abruptly derailed with the 
confrontation of danger, risk and uncertainty. Arguably, some of the cultural 
characteristics of institutions of the public police and the military are similar. Both are 
structured by rank and file hierarchies, and both require their members to confront 
various risks in the discharge of their duties. Specific scholarly investigations into 
military cultures offer rich insights such as the processes of dispossession of a 
civilian role (Hockey, 1986), the requirements and training exacted on new recruits 
that curb freewill (Mileham, 1998) and, what exactly the military institution requires of 
its membership (Lande, 2007). 
 
However, and crucially, the mandate of the military is inimitable and the military 
institution as a whole unique. The mission of the military, as Wilson (2008) details, is 
entirely different to other institutions as from the outset their primary mission ‘entails 
  
a readiness to take life and destroy property’ (p.22). Numerous recent sociological 
analyses have pointed to the violence-imbued nature of military work and 
encouragement to resist any explanatory logic of individualism put forward when 
interpreting violent behaviours of military/ex-military personnel (see Treadwell, 2016). 
Individual behaviours and actions of the occupational body are wedded to prevailing 
expectations and cultural context of the institution. As Hockey (1986) postulates, 
basic army training has two fundamental aims – to teach soldierly skills and to teach 
new recruits the canons of military discipline. 
 
The mission is a central tenet of military culture. The sense of mission is gained 
through a mutual coherence and commitment to this. Of course, orders are crucial in 
defining the mission and the expectations placed on various ranks and individuals; 
indeed, understanding what the mission is, and what tactics are required to meet the 
intended aim are fundamental doctrines impressed on each member of the military 
family respectively (Mileham, 1998). So, in a context such as the London Games in 
2012 where the mission or sense of mission is more opaque, blurred or less-than-
usual, problems for the military and individual personnel are likely to ensue. 
 
So how then may an unarmed military policing alongside an armed public police be 
problematised? The answer to this question may well rest in an excavation of the 
cultural facets of the military institution. As noted above by Wilson (1998), the 
determining contexts of military work are exceptional based on its antecedents and 
historical statements of purpose of ‘what a military force is for’. From basic training, 
military personnel undertake training which is deliberately oriented towards combat 
competencies. Despite what some military sociologists have suggested is the end of 
a ‘warrior ethos’ among the military in the face of rapid advancement in military 
technologies and methodologies (see Coker, 2007), soldiers are fundamentally 
prepared, from the outset, for engagement in combat roles, trained in weapons 
systems and schooled in what to do when engaging with ‘the enemy’. This sits in 
contrast to training in public policing. With its emphasis on community engagement, 
policing by consent and the considered application of discretion, basic training for the 
police is completely different. Indeed, those who are trained and later authorised in 
the public police to deploy lethal force, do so on a voluntary basis, and often later in 
their public policing career.     
 
Requiring military personnel to engage in an unarmed policing role is contrary to the 
cultural backcloth from which they emerge. While perhaps it is the case that the 
military will be trained in police tactics in advance of policing operations, the 
overarching canons of soldiering instilled through deliberate and sustained 
socialisation in the military unit may be challenging to suppress or cause conflict in 
negotiating, in an operational context, what cause of action to take. Military values 
are deeply impressed, and by way of example, Hockey (2009:481) indicates the 
significance of military acculturation in saying that ‘infantrymen possess an 
understanding of how to do the embodied work of their trade’ (author emphasis 
  
added).  Already we see that the military does not hold any special powers of arrest 
beyond those of citizen’s arrest. However, we know that some were equipped with 
handcuffs and others routinely carrying out policing tasks such as stop and search. 
Furthermore, established lines of police accountability will fail to apply in such 
circumstances rendering the public unable to easily access routes of redress and the 
individual soldier vulnerable to hostile treatment by their superiors or the State. 
 
The state of vulnerability that the unarmed soldier finds themselves within is 
indicative of their inability to compete on the basis of power relations. In Hockey’s 
(1986) ethnography of army recruits, he eloquently situates the powerless position of 
lower ranks. Hockey describes the requirement for lower ranks to follow orders 
(through the threat of coercive sanctions) and suppress disapproval. Indeed, he 
reflects how the soldier’s life and existence are fundamentally out of their own control 
and in the hands of higher ranking personnel. Further, access to information is 
commensurate to rank and the acting on orders with an impoverishment of 
information/context is standard in Hockey’s (1986) account. 
 
The ‘mission’ that an unarmed military who undertake policing activities engage 
within is challenging to observe from the outside, and likely difficult to comprehend 
within. If mission success is predicated on the ‘best’ and ‘correct’ instructions 
(Mileham, 1998), then while the ‘mission’ may succeed at what cost does this come 
when considering the precarious position military personnel may find themselves 
within. Expectations placed on them are to ‘police’. However they are not the public 
police, nor are they adequately trained or socialised into an institution which is built 
upon foundations of democratic policing; indeed, quite the opposite. The 
individualism of the soldier is subordinated to the group identity and the necessity to 
follow commands, however where commands may lack firm accountability 
foundations, then it is likely that lower ranks will suffer in the discharge of their 
metamorphosed mission objective. 
 
 
Conclusion  
This article has attempted to demystify the role of the military in an ever-evolving 
security landscape. While this must start by, we argue, adding to the sophisticated 
theoretical debate – what is perhaps more important is to make sense of the military 
involvement, in its many different forms to a growing concern about the 
accountability of policing provisions and counter-terror practices. Rather than offer 
neat answers to the complex and mixed forms of policing that emerged post 9/11 we 
have aimed to shine a light on some of the nuanced problems of blurring police and 
military roles, which currently appear to be going unnoticed. 
 
The security of mega-events, domestic counter-terror strategies, the accountability of 
the police force, the pluralisation of policing and the increasing involvement of the 
military in domestic security are defining issues of western states in the 21st Century. 
  
Academia is almost flooded with debates that concern all of these matters as 
scholars work to provide a critical eye on the ever-evolving security environment. 
Much of this work recognises that all of these problems are inextricably bound - most 
commonly from the perspective that the 'war on terror' connect them all. However, 
look a little deeper as there are some cautionary tales.   
 
First is that where public, media and political discourse accepts (and celebrates) the 
necessity of military presence on UK streets. This means that the potentially 
contradictory cultures, values and ethos (and enforcement ‘policing’ approaches) are 
not brought into as sharp a focus as we might imagine/expect, nor are accountability 
structures necessarily readily evident.  Second, while the deployment at the Games 
in 2012 was a response to a resource crisis, it was also a testing of the practical 
application of soldiers in roles with policing powers. Grey areas of stop and search 
and using the privileges under the terms and conditions of ticket purchasing to allow 
soldiers to search bags are abounding.  Interestingly, an illusion is created; in light of 
systemic G4S failures and the shortage of police resources to cover the human 
capacity needed, the military is called upon to fill spaces but do not fundamentally 
change the character of ‘policing’ and ‘order’ maintenance strategies.  The 
cautionary tale here though is in the absence of mediators and the lack of clearly 
drawn systems of authority and leadership (and the cultural acceptance and buy-in 
of soldiers to these) time needs to be taken to critically appraise the context in which 
policing is conducted.      
  
This then leaves the third great cautionary tale from the 2012 London Olympic 
Games, and more generally amidst greater pressures to adequately resource 
domestic security. If public police, the private sector and military assemblages are to 
resurrect themselves in the future, then establishing where ownership, control and 
leadership begin and end is pivotal. If global trends suggest greater shifts to 
pluralised policing methodologies to reduce crime/terror problems, then inspection 
into such issues (in addition to matters of justice, rights and the rule of law), must 
remain at the forefront of planning, implementation and critical review of pluralised 
policing of all types and the potential and actuality of blurred lines of policing beyond 
easy distinction.  
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